Convoy GP55
Convoy GP55 was a convoy of Allied ships that travelled from Sydney to Brisbane in June 1943 during World War II. The Japanese submarine I-174 attacked the convoy on 16 June, sinking the United States Army transport ship Portmar and damaging USS LST-469. The Australian military conducted an intensive search for the submarine in the days after the attack in the mistaken belief that she had been significantly damaged. This search was not successful and highlighted the unsatisfactory communications between the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force.
About Convoy GP55 in brief
Convoy GP55 was a convoy of Allied ships that travelled from Sydney to Brisbane in June 1943 during World War II. It comprised ten cargo ships, three landing ships, tank and an escort of five corvettes. The Japanese submarine I-174 attacked the convoy on 16 June, sinking the United States Army transport ship Portmar and damaging USS LST-469. The Australian military conducted an intensive search for the submarine in the days after the attack in the mistaken belief that she had been significantly damaged. This search was not successful and highlighted the unsatisfactory communications between the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force. Because of Japan’s deteriorating strategic situation, I- 174 was the last Imperial Japanese Navy submarine to operate off the Australian east coast. She was the only Japanese boat operating off Australia at the time, as all other available submarines were deployed to counter Allied advances in the Solomon Islands. The large number of Japanese attacks in 1943 put great strain on the Allied forces responsible for protecting shipping off eastern Australia. In response to the Japanese attacks, the Australian naval authorities ordered that all ships with a displacement of more than 1,200 tons and a maximum speed of less than 12 knots travel in escorted convoys from 8 June.
These convoys were successful in minimising losses, and no escorted ships were sunk off Australia during 1942. In January 1943, several successful attacks were made against ships travelling in convoys. The RAAF also greatly increased the number of aircraft allocated to escort convoys and ships sailing independently. Despite the Navy’s assurances, Australia’s anti-submarine forces were constrained by a shortage of training opportunities and poor coordination between the RAN, RAAF and the U.S. Navy. The Advisory War Council sought information from the R AN and RAAF on the actions being taken to protect shipping. The RAN acknowledged that the Bathurst-classCorvettes that made up most of its escort force were too slow, but it argued that the losses suffered by escorted convoy were no worse than those in other parts of the world. In contrast with 1942, several successfully attacked ships travelled in convoy in 1943, but they did not sustain any damage. In April and May, a force of five boats from the IJN’s 3rd Submarine Squadron attacked shipping along the full length of the Australian East Coast in an attempt to disrupt the Allied supply line to New Guinea. This marked the peak of the Japanese submarine offensive against Australia and nine ships were sinking within a month.
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This page is based on the article Convoy GP55 published in Wikipedia (as of Oct. 30, 2020) and was automatically summarized using artificial intelligence.
