British logistics in the Normandy campaign
The British Army developed a doctrine based on using machinery as a substitute for manpower. In the Second World War, the Army relied entirely on motor transport to move supplies between the railheads and the divisional depots. The Army embraced motor transport and mechanisation as a means of increasing the tempo of operations. By the time of the invasion of the UK in 1940, the Home Forces needed a division of 36,500.
About British logistics in the Normandy campaign in brief
Logistics in the Normandy campaign played a key role in the success of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. The objective of the campaign was to secure a lodgement on the mainland of Europe for further operations. Planning for this operation had begun in 1942. The success of the 21st Army Group was in large part due to its logistics, which provided the operational commanders with enormous capacity and tremendous flexibility. By 26 July, 675,000 personnel, 150,000 vehicles and 690,000 tonnes of stores had been landed. The advance was much faster than expected and the rapid increase in the length of the line of communications threw up logistical challenges that, together with increased German resistance, threatened to stall the Allied armies. By mid-September, the Allies had liberated most of France and Belgium. After a rapid advance, the British Guards Armoured Division liberated Brussels, the Belgian capital, on 3 September and the 11th Armoured division captured Antwerp the following day. The British Army developed a doctrine based on using machinery as a substitute for manpower. In the Second World War, the Army relied entirely on motor transport to move supplies between the railheads and the divisional depots. The Army embraced motor transport and mechanisation as a means of increasing the tempo of operations. The wholesale mechanisation of the infantry and artillery was ordered in 1934 and by 1938 the British Army had only 5,200 horses, compared with 28,700 in the eve of the Great War in 1914.
In March 1941 the War Cabinet decided that the Army had reached its maximum size of 39,500, although the manpower was still ‘ceiling’ to be raised. By this time the Home Forces planned to rely on civilian resources for transportation, but this meant raising more logistical units that required conversion of other units. The Home Forces had a slice of the German invasion of 25,000, but required one division to carry out overseas operations. By the time of the invasion of the UK in 1940, the. Home Forces needed a division of 36,500. The German invasion required a division. to carryout overseas operations, but this required the conversion of a division to 39, 500,000. The. British Army concentrated on repelling a cross-channel attack rather than repelling the German attack. On 19 June 1940, General Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Army, ordered that all line of. communications units not required for defence be disbanded and no further units be raised for home defence. On the same day, General Dill ordered that no further lines of communications units were needed for defence, and all further units were raised for the defence of the Home. Forces in the UK were to be concentrated on the event of a home invasion, but at the time this meant that the home forces had a. slice of. the German. invasion of Britain would not need to be carried out for the first time for more than a year. The home. forces were to concentrate their resources on the. event of the home invasion.
You want to know more about British logistics in the Normandy campaign?
This page is based on the article British logistics in the Normandy campaign published in Wikipedia (as of Nov. 01, 2020) and was automatically summarized using artificial intelligence.
